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FOREWORD 
During the period 1973-1979 the Energy Systems Program Group at  the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis had as its central aim t o  conceive and construct 
a long-range picture of  global energy developments. The article reprinted here sums up, 
for two benchmark scenarios, the balance of  supply and demand through 2030. 
The article appeared originally in the Centennial Issue of Science, volume 2 0 9 . 4  July 
(1 980). 
For a detailed account of the work on which the results described in this article are 
based, as well as full treatment of  the results of IIASA's energy analyses, see Energy Systems 
Program Group of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Wolf Hafele, 
Program Leader, Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis, Ballinger, Cam- 
bridge, Massachusetts, 1981. A briefer account for the general reader prepared by the same 
group appears in Energy in a Finite World: Paths to a Sustainable Future, Ballinger, Cam- 
bridge, Massachusetts, 1981. An appendix t o  this reprint gives a list of  other publications 
of the Energy Systems Prograin Group. 
ROGER LEVIEN 
Director 

A Global and Long-Range Picture 
of Energy Developments 
Wolf Hafele 
A Time Frame for Global and that were essential for the first industrial 
Long-Range Energy Developments revolution. Figure 1 shows the decline 
and rise of market shares of various 
In the middle of the last century wood types of primary energy in the United 
was the predominant source of energy, States. The data are plotted in such a 
meeting roughly 70 to 80 percent of the de- way that a logistic curve becomes a 
mand. This meant large-scale gathering straight line. It should be noted that 
and led to a first energy crisis, which was there are remarkable regularities in the 
Summary. Most studies of energy supply and demand ignore either global inter- 
dependence or the long time spans necessary to adjust to new energy sources. The 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis has therefore studied on a global 
scale, for seven major world regions, the balance between energy supply and de- 
mand for the next 50 years. Reported here are the results for two benchmark sce- 
narios. In the "low" scenario world energy consumption increases from today's 8.2 
terawatt-year per year to 22 terawatt-year per year in 2030; in the "high" scenario, 
consumption increases to 35 terawatt-year per year. The study showed that time will 
be the limiting constraint in adapting the energy supply infrastructure to changing re- 
source availability; resources will be available until the second half of the next cen- 
tury, but a strong shift will be required to low-grade fossil fuels such as shale oil and 
tar sands. Each scenario studied indicated increased environmental problems associ- 
ated with increased use of fossil fuels, and potential geopolitical problems associated 
with the world distribution of resources. 
overcome by a fundamental change in 
technology: Coal was used as a substitute 
for wood. The higher density of coal meant 
not only more energy but also easier 
storability and transportability, features 
The author is deputy director of the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Laxenburg, 
Austria. and leader of the Energy Systems Program 
at IIASA. 
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ades. The regularities of such market 
penetrations have been studied in great 
depth (I) .  What is concluded here is that 
it is appropriate to consider the time 
frame 1980 to 2030 when developments 
of energy demand and supply and their 
underlying infrastructure are to be dis- 
cussed. 
It also seems appropriate to consider 
the world as a whole. Indeed, today 
roughly 25 percent of the world's energy 
supplies come from one place on the 
globe, the Middle East, and this creates a 
strong technical and political linkage for 
almost all parts of the world. On the 
demand side the situation is similar. For 
instance, a political debate continues to 
focus on the notion of a "new economic 
order" viewing the world as a whole and 
addressing the problem of developing 
the so-called "South" of the world. 
Although political in nature, this de- 
bate nevertheless makes it plain that 
the demand for energy must also be seen 
in such a perspective. By contrast, most 
of the major studies of energy approach 
the problem on a national scale and use a 
short- to medium-range planning hori- 
zon, say 10 to I5 years. While this is 
clearly necessary, it is not sufficient. Of- 
ten the result of such studies is the iden- 
tification of required imports; the feasi- 
bility of such imports is left open. In- 
deed, others may have planned to import 
the same barrel of oil. It is thus global 
comprehensiveness and consistency that 
must come into focus, particularly when 
the time frame reaches out to the year 
2030. 
data over extended time periods. One 
such regularity is the slope of these 
curves. Its constancy means continued 
logistic substitution of one source by an- 
other over decades. For the United 
States it has always taken roughly six 
decades for a new energy source to con- 
quer 50 percent of the market. For the 
world as a whole the figure is ten dec- 
The IIASA Energy Systems Program 
Such a global and long-range view 
characterizes the approach of the Energy 
Systems Program of the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
at Laxenburg, near Vienna, Austria. 
IIASA was conceived in the late 1960's 
with the idea of studying problems of 
civilization identified as likely to become 
overwhelming in industrialized nations 
in the 1970's and 1980's. The United 
States and the Soviet Union are the lead 
nations, but there were ten more nations 
to found the Institute in 1972 and five 
more nations have joined in the mean- 
time, bringing the total to 17 member na- 
tions (2). The institute is nongovernmen- 
tal, the member countries being repre- 
sented by their academies of sciences or 
similar bodies. Topics of research in- 
clude, among others, food, urbanization, 
environment, water, industrial manage- 
ment, energy, and the related mathemat- 
ical methods. The Energy Systems Pro- 
gram started with the beginning of 
IIASA in 1973 and has now concluded a 
major study, Energy in u Finite World 
(3) .  Over the years more than 140 scien- 
tists from more than 20 nations, East, 
West, and South alike, have for longer or 
briefer periods joined the program. From 
the United States, for example, Alan 
Manne, Bernard Spinrad, Amory Lov- 
ins, Paul Basile, and others have partici- 
pated in the study. An explicit attempt 
was made to incorporate as many views 
and to be as objective as possible. The 
idea was to understand the factual basis 
of the energy problem, that is, to identify 
the facts and conditions for any energy 
policy. Given the worldwide nature of 
the institute it was not the intent to go 
into the politics or societal aspects of the 
energy problem as seen from particular 
nations. In this article I report some ma- 
jor results of IIASA's Energy Systems 
Program. 
The Approach Taken and Its 
Methodological Problems 
In choosing our approach to this global 
and long-range study our guiding idea 
was to understand the transitions that 
will be necessary when the fossil fuels 
now in use begin to run out. An attempt 
was made to determine the supply limits 
for energy from coal, nuclear, and solar 
sources, with special emphasis being giv- 
en to the problem of local, renewable en- 
ergy sources. We also studied the con- 
ceivable constraints on energy strate- 
gies, such as those imposed by the pro- 
duction of waste heat, the release of 
carbon dioxide, and the relative risks of 
each strategy. We found consistently 
that time is the most precious resource; 
and time therefore imposes the most se- 
vere constraint on possible actions. We 
then used our results to identify strate- 
gies appropriate for the transition from 
the present infrastructure of energy sup- 
ply and demand to a futuristic one with 
explicit emphasis on the evolving energy 
demand. Since it is not possible to make 
predictions 50 years into the future, and 
since such predictions require political 
and societal considerations that we did 
not include, we chose the method of sce- 
nario writing. We wished to stress inter- 
nal consistency and global comprehen- 
siveness. This required the development 
and application of a set of appropriate 
mathematical models (4 ) ,  because only 
through quantification can one reach the 
degree of consistency required to pre- 
vent, for example, the same barrel of oil 
being assigned to two different countries 
or for two different purposes. However, 
one must be prudent in interpreting the 
numerical results thus obtained; they 
must not be take too literally. In fact, 
they must be seen as quantitative ex- 
pressions of the more qualitative situa- 
tions that underlie the scenarios. The 
goal is to understand and conceptualize 
the worldwide situation for the next fi\ 
decades. 
Since it is neither possible nor desir- 
able to write scenarios for 150 nations, 
we chose instead to study seven world 
regions (see Fig. 2) selected mostly on 
the basis of economical status rather 
than geographical proximity. Region I, 
North America, has a developed market 
economy and is rich in resources. Region 
11, the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu- 
rope, is characterized by its developed, 
planned economies and rich resources. 
Region I11 includes member countries of 
the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) (except 
North America) and is characterized by 
poor energy resources. Region IV is Latin 
America. Region V, Southeast Asia and 
Africa, is a developing region with a high 
population and only a few resources. Re- 
gion VI includes the oil-rich Arab coun- 
tries. Region VII includes the centrally 
planned Asian economies. 
Fig. I .  Pnrnary energy sub- 
stitution, United States. 
Region Region 
I North Amerlca L::::l V Afr ica(exce t Northern Africa and South ~ f r i c a ) . ~ o u t h  and 
11 Soviet Unlon and Eaatern Europe Southeast Asia 
m]]]~] 111 Weatern Europe.Japan,Auatralla.New mm VI East and Northern Africa 
Zealand. South Africa. and larael  
0 IV Latin Amerlca C 7  Vll  China Aa an and economies centrally planned 
Fig. 2. The seven world regions. 
These regions were used to construct 
the two benchmark scenarios described 
below that provide an overall picture of 
the global energy situation. However, 
each individual nation or group of na- 
tions also requires a more specific analy- 
sis that is consistent with the overall 
global picture. Such work is now in prog- 
ress. For example, the IIASA Energy 
Systems Program is engaged in an active 
dialogue with the European Communities 
in Brussels. The Communities, using a 
bottom-up approach, are planning spe- 
cific energy strategies by adding up the 
expectations of the member countries, 
while IIASA, with a top-down approach, 
is providing the global picture of energy 
availability. The results have been both 
unexpected and helpful (5). A similar 
dialogue is going on between IIASA and 
Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, the Soviet Union and, to some 
extent, OPEC (Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) members and other 
nations and groups. 
Two Benchmark Scenarios 
Two benchmark scenarios have been 
elaborated in great detail. These are la- 
beled "high" and "low," the former re- 
ferring to a situation in which the de- 
mand for energy is relatively high, the 
latter to a situation in which the demand 
is relatively low. These scenarios allow 
for a certain inter- and extrapolation and 
thus leave the reader with a choice; both 
Table 1 .  Historical and projected growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP), by region, for 
the high and low scenarios (percentage per year). 
Historical Scenario projection 
- 
Region 1950 1960 1975 1985 2000 2015 
to to to to to to 
1960 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
I 
I1 
I11 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
World 
I + 111* 
IV + v + VI* 
I 
I I 
I11 
I v 
v 
VI 
VII 
World 
I + III* 
IV + v + VI* 
High scenario 
3.4 4.3 
6.5 5 .O 
5.2 4.3 
6.1 6.2 
5.5 5.8 
9.8 7.2 
6.1 5.0 
5 .o 4.7 
4.4 4.3 
6.5 6.3 
L o w  scenario 
3.4 3.1 
6.5 4.5 
5.2 3.2 
6.1 4.7 
5.5 4.8 
9.8 5.6 
6.1 3.3 
5 .O 3.6 
4.4 3.1 
6.5 5.0 
*Presented for purposes of comparison with data in (18) and other global studies which exclude centrally 
planned economies. Note: Historical and projected values of GDP in constant (1975) U.S.  dollars are given in 
Chant (19). 
Table 2. Final energy (in the year 2030) in the two scenarios compared to final energy calculated 
with historical elasticities. 
High With his- Differ- LOW With his- Differ- 
scenario torical e,* ence+ scenario torical <,* ence+ 
Region (GW-year/ (GW-year/ (%) (GW-year/ (GW-year/ (%, 
year) year) year) year) 
1 
I I 
I11 
I v 
v 
VI 
VII 
World 
'Calculated by using historical (1950 to 1975) final energy-to-GDP elasticity (€3 for each re- 
glon. tcalculated as final energy using historical e, minus IIASA scenario projection divided by final 
energy using historical e,. 
scenarios result in a mix of energy 
sources. Three alternative scenarios 
were also investigated: one in which 
there is a worldwide nuclear moratori- 
um, one in which there is an all-out effort 
to develop nuclear energy, and one in- 
corporating very strong energy conser- 
vation measures. Here attention will be 
given to the high and the low scenarios. 
Energy Demand 
Population growth, economic growth, 
technological progress, and structural 
evolution are the four principal determi- 
nants of energy demand. According to 
Keyfitz ( 6 ) ,  an overall population growth 
from 4 billion today to 8 billion by the 
year 2030 has been considered, and the 
disaggregated numbers for the seven 
world regions were used in the analysis 
described here. Eight billion is a con- 
servative estimate, since it implies that 
by the year 2015 the average family will 
have only two children, the age structure 
then prevailing being the cause of world 
population growth even after 2015. Al- 
though one can make estimates of popu- 
lation growth, it is impossible to predict 
economic growth rates, because these 
are strongly influenced by innovations, 
know-how, and skills of all kinds. In- 
stead, one has to make assumptions. We 
intended to be conservative and there- 
fore assumed declining economic growth 
rates throughout. Further, we recog- 
nized that developing countries would be 
limited in their growth potential to one or 
two percentage points above the growth 
rates of the developed countries (7). This 
implies that for the next few decades the 
developing countries will still be tied to 
the rest of the world economy through 
trade and other relations. It is unrealistic 
to assume a high growth rate in the de- 
veloping part of the world while the 
OECD countries have a low or zero 
growth rate. When constructing the sce- 
narios we found that growth rates are 
generally restricted by the conditions re- 
quired for interregional consistency and 
the balance of energy demand and sup- 
ply. Thus, if one connects the 1975 and 
2030 points by an exponential curve (the 
decline of growth rates therefore not 
being expressed) one obtains a 3.4 per- 
cent rate of economic growth for the high 
scenario and 2.4 percent rate of growth 
for the low scenario. Disaggregated in 
time and space the picture is as ex- 
plained in Table I. 
On the basis of these assumptions we 
estimated the related energy demands. It 
is particularly important to distinguish 
between primary and final energy, the 
former being crude oil or coal, for ex- 
ample, the latter gasoline or electricity. 
For the long-range and globally compre- 
hensive scenarios it is not feasible to 
base an evaluation on prices and elastic- 
ities. It is more appropriate to consider, 
and account for, the physical end uses of 
energy. Such accounting has been for- 
malized in the MEDEE model (8) and 
pioneered by the Grenoble group ( 9 ) ,  
among others. It calls for the identifica- 
tion of life-style, as well as economic and 
technical parameters related to energy 
end uses. A problem associated with the 
MEDEE model is internal consistency. 
Usually one can force such consistency 
by relying on an input-output approach, 
for example. But when we consider the 
evolution of energy infrastructures we 
ask for the evolution of input-output co- 
efficients and therefore only shift the 
problem somewhere else. Thus the re- 
sults obtained are subject to debate, but 
so is the future of the economies in ques- 
tion. Generally it was assumed that a sig- 
nificant degree of energy conservation 
would take place. 
Table 2 shows the aggregate results for 
the seven world regions and their dif- 
ferences with respect to historical 
trends. The high scenario provides for a 
higher degree of conservation because 
higher economic growth rates usually al- 
low for more innovation and structural 
change. Physically, even higher degrees 
of energy conservation are possible. En- 
ergy consumption can be restrained ei- 
ther by not meeting needs or by sub- 
stituting many of the services that come 
from energy with services that come 
from capital or labor. However, related 
to this are problems of the structure of 
the economies in question. For example, 
it may not be possible to maintain high 
levels of productivity if there is a sub- 
stantial increase in the number of people 
seeking employment in the service sec- 
tor. Such an increase could also have 
geopolitical implications, particularly in 
the case of larger nations. In fact, these 
problems reach far beyond the domain of 
energy. Here we chose not to make ex- 
treme assumptions. It was then legiti- 
mate to look for an overall indication of 
the nature of the two demand scenarios. 
Figure 3 shows the ratio of energy to 
gross domestic product, or, in other 
words, the overall energy intensiveness 
in the past and in the two scenarios. 
A certain regularity is evident, pointing 
to a decreasing energy intensiveness in 
general. It is felt that such regularity is 
one of the characteristics of the demand 
scenarios. 
There is a major observation in con- 
nection with analyzing energy demand 
that is quite robust against parameter 
variations. In view of the balance be- 
tween energy demand and supply, we 
found it necessary in our scenario writ- 
ings to restrict the uses of hydrocarbons 
to those where substitution is difficult, 
for example, as chemical feedstocks. 
The transportation sector was also as- 
sumed to need hydrocarbons, because 
other end-use technologies (which could, 
for example, use hydrogen instead) will 
penetrate too slowly to make a world- 
wide difference before 2030. It was then 
not surprising to find that in region 11, 
long-range planning indeed requires the 
use of liquid hydrocarbons exclusively 
for chemicat and transportation pur- 
poses. But this approach is not impera- 
tive. Chemical feedstock could also 
come from synthesis gas and more elec- 
tricity might be used in the transporta- 
tion sector. But scenario writing requires 
that we make such considerations ex- 
plicit. 
A demand for final energy leads to a 
demand for primary energy and there- 
fore implies a combination of energy 
conversion processes. Such combina- 
tions result from the availability of fossil 
and nuclear fuels, from build-up rates of 
new conversion technologies, such as 
coal liquefaction, and from cost opti- 
mization. A linear programming model, 
MESSAGE, was used to identify optimal 
combinations (10). Actually, discounted 
costs were optimized and this led to the 
usual question about the appropriateness 
of such optimization. However. the re- 
sults obtained were characterized more 
by the constraints than by the type of the 
objective function. Indeed, a Iinear pro- 
gramming procedure accomplishes two 
things: it optimizes and it handles the 
many constraints that must necessarily 
be considered in an orderly fashion. In 
our scenarios the window of feasibility 
turned out to be small, that is, the prob- 
lem was feasibility, not optimality. 
Thus the required primary energy sup- 
plies are given in Table 3 disaggregated 
by regions. By the year 2030 the total 
global demand for primary energy is 
roughly 36 terawatt-year per year for the 
high scenario, and 22 TW-year per year 
for the low scenario ( I 1  ). This compares 
with 8.2 TW-year per year today. Thus, 
between 1975 and 2030, the demand for 
primary energy increases by a factor of 
4.4 and 2.7. respectively, for the high 
and low scenarios; on a per capita basis 
there is a 2.2- and 1.35-fold increase, re- 
spectively. in primary energy demand. It 
Table 3. Two supply scenarios, primary energy by region, 1975 to 2030 (terawatt-year per year). 
-- -- 
High scenario Low scenario 
Region 1975 -- 
2000 2030 2000 2030 
I 
11 
111 
1v 
v 
VI 
VII 
Total* 
*Columns may not sum to totals because of rounding. tlncludes 0.21 TW-year per year of bunker fuel oil. 
2.50 { A Historical (1850.1860.1 870.1875) 
100 250 500 1000 2500 5000 10,000 25.000 
GDP per capita ($  1875) 
Fig. 3. Energy intensiveness ir. different world regions. 
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should be noted that the supply of energy 
continues to be very uneven. The ratio 
of energy supply in regions IV + V + 
VI + V11 (the South) compared with re- 
gions 1 + I 1  + 111 (the North) shows on- 
ly a slight improvement. The ratio im- 
proves by a factor of 3 from 0.23 to 0.75 
in the high scenario, and by a factor of 
2.6 from 0.23 to 0.6 in the low scenario. 
Realistically, one must expect the 
growth of energy demand, at least in re- 
gions IV, V, VI, and VII, to continue in- 
creasing beyond the year 2030, for rea- 
sons of population growth as well as rea- 
sons of economic growth. Thus, supply 
options must be evaluated against a 
yardstick of 2 to 3 TW-year per year if a 
contribution of about I0 percent of the 20 
to 30 TW-year per year of the total global 
demand is to be envisaged. 
Energy Supply and Related 
Technologies 
Let us now turn to the disaggregation 
by source. This was done for each region 
separately, and here I only give such dis- 
aggregation for the world as a whole be- 
cause space is limited. Figure 4 refers to 
the high scenario and gives the relative 
shares; the pattern for the low scenario is 
quite similar. 
There is a somewhat constant share of 
gas and a decline in the share of oil. 
This is because synthetic liquids from 
coal are used as substitutes. Coal there- 
fore has to be set aside for this purpose, 
and this in turn becomes possible because 
nuclear power takes over large portions 
of electricity generation. Hydropower 
has a somewhat constant share, while 
Table 4. Two supply scenarios, global primary energy by source, 1975 to 2030 (terawatt-year 
per year). 
- - -- -  -. - - --- 
Base High scenario Low scenario 
Primary source* year -
1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
-- 
Oil 3.62 5.89 6.83 4.75 5.02 
Gas 1.51 3.11 5.97 2.53 3.47 
Coal 2.26 4.94 1 1.98 3.92 6.45 
Light-water reactor 0.12 1.70 3.21 1.27 1.89 
Fast breeder reactor 0 0.04 4.88 0.02 3.28 
Hydroelectricity 0.50 0.83 1.46 0.83 1.46 
Solart 0 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.30 
Other$ 0.2 1 0.22 0.81 0.17 0.52 
Total5 8.2 1 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39 
.- - - 
*Primary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or refining processes: for example, coal 
used to make synthetic liquid fuel is counted in coal figures. tlncludes mostly "soft" solar, that is, indi- 
vidual rooftop collectors; also small amounts of centralized solar electricit $"Otherw includes biogas, 
geothermal energy, commercial wood use, as  well as bunker fuel 011; for &OO and 2030, bunker fuel is not 
estimated. §Columns may not sum to total because of rounding. 
Table 5. Region VI (Middle East and Northern Africa) oil production rates and capacity and as- 
sumed production ceiling (million barrels of oil per day). Non-region VI OPEC countries are 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria, Gabon, and Indonesia. Eight OPEC member countries are in 
region VI; six in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, 
and Qatar) and two in Northern Africa (Algeria and Libya). 
-- . 
Region or country 1975 1977 
Prot i~rct ion roles 
OPEC member countries 27.19 31.53 
Minus non-region VI OPEC member countries - 5.82 - 6.52 
OPEC and region VI countries 2 1.37 25.01 
Plus non-OPEC region V1 countries* + 1.05 + 0.99 
Region VI 22.42 26.00 
Of which exported 2 1.23 24.64 
Production capacities t 
Saudi Arabia 10.7 10.8 
Iran 6.5 6.8 
Iraq 3 .O 2.6 
Kuwait 2.9 3.0 
Libya 2.3 2.5 
United Arab Emirates 2.3 2.3 
Algeria 1.3 I .O 
Qatar 0.6 0.7 
Estimate of other region VI countries$ 1.4 1.4 
Region VI 3 1 .O 31.8 
Estimated long-term region VI "ceiling": 33.6 
- 
*Seven countries in the Middle East: Bahrain. Jordan. Lebanon. Oman, Syria. North Yemen, and South 
Yemen, and one in Northern Africa (Egypt). thoduction capacities are estimates from the Department of 
Energy (20) for 1975 and from Petroleum Infelligence Week/y (21 )  for 1977. tIIASA estimate. 
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the other renewables have a rather low 
share. This is more an outcome of the 
cost optimization routine than a state- 
ment of the potential or desirability of 
such renewable resources. More will be 
said about this below. What must be 
emphasized here is the advent of two 
major technologies in the year 2000: 
synliquids and the fast breeder reactor. 
Synliquids should be interpreted as syn- 
thetic hydrocarbons of any kind, for ex- 
ample, methanol, gasoline, or even 
methane. But in the scenarios the de- 
mand for energy in liquid form was par- 
ticularly pressing, and thus it was labeled 
as synliquid. It was assumed that the 
processes in question would be autother- 
ma]. (In autothermal gasification and liq- 
uefaction schemes both the process heat 
and the required hydrogen come from 
the coal itself, in addition to what is 
needed for the chemical coal content of 
the synfuels. This means a difference of a 
factor of 3 to 4 between autothermal and 
allothermal processes. In an allothermal 
process, the process heat and the re- 
quired hydrogen are supplied exoge- 
nously, preferably by means of either nu- 
clear or solar power.) To have synliquids 
and the fast breeder reactor in use by the 
year 2000 would mean an installed ca- 
pacity of dozens of gigawatt-thermal or, 
what is equivalent, dozens of million 
tons of coal (tce). It would not be suf- 
ficient to have one or two demonstration 
plants by this time. Although there are 
regional differences in these require- 
ments, this means that aggressive action 
in an overall context is required now. 
Of particular interest is the dis- 
aggregation by source in absolute terms 
as given in Table 4. What is striking is 
the increase in oil use. This means a tran- 
sition to ever higher production costs 
and, consequently, a transition to oil 
shale and tar sands. Also the production 
of gas increases. Perhaps most indicative 
is the case of coal. Many may argue that 
an increase of up to 12 TW-year per year 
(high scenario) is impossible. This may 
indeed be the case. But if we are to be 
globally comprehensive we must then ask: 
What will we have instead? The low sce- 
nario? More solar? Indeed, it was our in- 
tent in this scenario analysis to seek 
answers to such questions. Nuclear 
power takes on a medium-size share. It 
should be noted that all the numbers refer 
to thermal energy production per year; 
for example, the figure for light-water 
reactor plus fast breeder reactor in the 
low scenario is 5.17 TW-per year. This 
relates roughly to an installed capacity of 
3000 gigawatt-electric by the year 2030, 
which is quite close to the results obtained 
in a recent study on the future of nu- 
clear power on a worldwide basis (12). 
Solar power here refers to local, or 
"soft," uses of solar power. 
More Oil 
The most important aspect of Table 4 
is the increase of what is labeled as oil. 
How could this be achieved? Both pro- 
duction and resource constraints must be 
considered. Figure 5 shows production 
requirements for the world excluding 
centrally planned economies. Indeed, by 
the year 2010 production from known re- 
serves of conventional oil will be ap- 
proaching exhaustion. New reserves 
were accounted for in the analysis. Cases 
like Mexico illustrate the point. But 
more is required. Unconventional oil 
such as that obtained from tar sands, oil 
shales, heavy crudes, and enhanced re- 
covery take over an ever larger share. 
After the year 2000 it becomes necessary 
to add coal liquefaction, yielding a total 
oil production outside region VI that still 
does not meet the minimum demand of 
liquids required for chemical feedstocks 
and transportation. Continued imports 
from region VI are necessary, and it is 
indeed one of the crucial assumptions in 
the analysis that region VI would contin- 
ue to have a production ceiling of 33 mil- 
lion barrels of oil per day. 'This ceiling is 
50 percent greater than the 1975 oil pro- 
duction of this region, and about 30 per- 
cent above its 1977 production rate. Re- 
gion VI is not the OPEC (Table 5 explains 
the relation between these two entities). 
So the conclusion is that the worldwide 
struggle for oil will continue; only some 
time after the year 2030 could this situa- 
tion change. Obviously, one also has to 
envisage.lower production ceilings in re- 
gion VI. This leads quickly to very awk- 
ward situations. More unconventional 
sources of energy would be required and 
even more coal liquefaction. We studied 
the consequences of having a ceiling of 
30 million barrels of oil per day and 
found them tough. In view of the general 
lack of elasticity in the oil market, ad- 
justments of demand will also be tough. 
Reduced economical growth rates are a 
most likely consequence. 
But what about the availability of re- 
sources? An attempt to explain this is 
made in Table 6 .  One should note the dif- 
ference between 837 TW-year for the 
grand total and 281 TW-year for the con- 
ventional resources (28 1 TW-year relates 
roughtly to 200 billion tons of oil equiva- 
lent). The difference between 837 and 
281 TW-year is made up by uncon- 
ventional resources (see also Fig. 5) .  
For example, in region I the 126 TW- 
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Fig. 4. Global primary energy, high scenario, 
1975 to 2030. 
year of oil shale and tar sands refers to 
deposits in such areas as Colorado in the 
United States and Athabaska in Canada; 
the 178 TW-year refers mostly to the Ori- 
noco area in Venezuela. The potential of 
these are?s is equal to or larger than that 
of the Persian Gulf. But the necessity to 
use these resources, as is indicated in 
Fig. 5 ,  implies tremendous environmen- 
tal consequences. Despite all the envi- 
ronmental analysis already performed 
today, this situation provides a new di- 
mension of its own that requires more 
work and imagination. A natural reaction 
would be to declare the use of these de- 
posits undesirable and perhaps infea- 
sible. But the overall global balance be- 
tween demand and supply must be kept 
in mind. It is particularly region 111 that 
would have to look for alternatives. One 
such alternative would be gas from re- 
gion I1 and perhaps region VI-with all 
the geopolitical consequences; this re- 
quires a separate consideration ( I S ) .  
World Oil Exports 
How are these exports of region VI al- 
located to the other regions? The answer 
to this question requires a major study 
Table 6. Ultimately recoverable oil resources (all numbers in terawatt-years). 
Unconventional 
Conven- Deep Region offshore Enhanced Oil shale tional Total 
and recovery and tar sands polar areas 
I 
I1 
I11 
IV 
v 
v I 
VII 
Total§ 
*lncIudes 170 TW-year of heavy crude oil. tRegion VI is not expected, within the next 50 years, to make 
extensive use of tertiary recovery techniques. $Includes heavy crude oil and some possibly deep offshore 
oil. PThe analysis of region VII is necessarily rough, because few published data are available. 
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Fig. 5 .  Oil supply and demand, 1975 to 2030 for the world, excluding centrally planned econo- 
mies, high scenario. 
on the future of world trade. Such a 
study has not yet been possible at 
IIASA, because it requires more eco- 
nomical than energy-analytical skills. It 
has been possible, however, to sketch a 
trading scenario by using an inter- 
regional gaming routine developed by 
the Siberian Power Institute at Irkutsk. 
For this routine it is assumed that region 
V1 dominates the market and that region 
V1 wants to maximize its revenues with- 
in the production ceiling of 33 million 
barrels of oil per day,  using it for both 
export from the region and domestic 
consumption in the region. Limiting fac- 
tors are the synfuels as  produced in the 
importing regions. The result is given in 
Fig. 6. The scenarios point to a situation 
where regions I ,  11, IV, and V11 are self- 
sufficient in 2030. This means that the ex- 
ports from region V1 are going only to  
two regions: 111 and V. Western Europe 
and Japan must compete with the devel- 
oping countries of region V, and region 
111 must reduce its oil imports to  let re- 
gion V have its share. Again one must 
point to the geopolitical implications 
(13 ). 
Coal and Nuclear Power 
Coal can be considered in a similar 
manner. Unusually high figures for 
yearly productions have to be assumed: 
in region I up to  2700 million tce per 
year, in region I1 up to 3500 million tce 
per year, and in region 111 up to 1000 mil- 
lion tce per year. Both regions I and 11 
are asked in the scenarios to assume an 
export function for coal much in the 
same sense as  region VI is asked to ex- 
port oil. An indicative figure for regions I 
and I1 in the high scenario is 600 million 
tce each by the year 2030. All this comes 
on top of the above considered produc- 
tion of oil from shale oils and tar sands. 
Today this appears inconceivable, but 
the global energy problem is just of that 
dimension. In any event,  one has to ex- 
pect coal to be in short supply after the 
year 2000. While it seems natural to go 
into autothermal coal liquefaction and 
gasification schemes today, such short- 
ages of coal supply after the year 2000 
may force the use of allothermal lique- 
faction and gasification schemes, be- 
cause these would reduce the demand 
for coal used for synfuels by a factor of 
roughly 3 to 4. Apart from coal supply, 
there is the problem of carbon dioxide 
production from fossil fuels, which might 
equally demand the use of allothermal 
schemes. However, the two reference 
scenarios imply autothermal liquefaction 
schemes. For these two scenarios the re- 
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Fig. 6. Oil trading between regions in 1975 and 
2030, high scenario (gigawatt-year per year; 1 
GW-year per year = 14,000 barrels of oil per 
day). 
lated CO, buildup is given in Fig. 7, ac- 
cording to Niehaus' model (14). Even 
today the situation looks serious. 
Nuclear power in the supply scenarios 
is represented on a medium scale. As 
mentioned earlier, the 5.17 TW-year per 
year of the low scenario relate to 3000 
GW-electric of installed capacity by the 
year 2030. In the high scenario the re- 
spective figures are 8.09 TW-year per 
year and 4800 GW-electric. In the analy- 
sis it was concluded that not more than 
10,000 GW-electric could be installed by 
the year 2030 even if there were a world- 
wide and lasting effort to develop nuclear 
power. However. some additional nucle- 
a r  potential may exist that could be used 
when obtaining fossil power-from un- 
conventional fields-becomes too cum- 
bersome. The generation of hydrogen by 
electrolytic or thermolytic means could, 
for instance, facilitate the allothermal 
schemes of coal liquefaction or gasifica- 
tion. If nuclear power were to  be in- 
stalled on such a scale, it would be nec- 
essary in any event to  base it on the prin- 
ciple of breeding, because the integrated 
demand for uranium comes close to  8.5 
million tons in our high scenario. In prac- 
tice it is not intended to restrict the use 
of nuclear power to light-water reactors 
and fast breeders. All prudent reactor 
strategies, including the high-temper- 
ature and the heavy-water reactors, 
should be employed as  long as  the global 
supply conditions for natural uranium 
(and thorium) are kept in mind. There 
have been many studies on this subject, 
for example, those of INFCE (Inter- 
national Fuel Cycle Evaluation), so  it is 
unnecessary to  go into greater detail 
here. However, a word on fusion must 
be added. Strategically, fusion can sub- 
stitute for the breeder reactor because it 
produces primarily electricity and is de 
facto decoupled from the resource ques- 
tion. There are also many other similar- 
ities between the fusion and the fast 
breeder reactor (IS). But it is considered 
unlikely that a fusion capacity greater 
than, say, 1000 GW-electric could be in- 
stalled before the year 2030. Although its 
strategic potential might be utilized, es- 
sentially this will be after the year 2030. 
Hard and Soft Solar Power 
It is necessary to  distinguish between 
hard and soft solar power. Hard solar 
power refers to large solar power fields 
that might be installed, for instance, in 
the Sahara or in other sunny desert 
areas. Assuming an effective density of 
20 watts per square meter for the produc- 
tion of solar electricity, it would take on- 
ly 500,000 square kilometers to install a 
capacity of 10 TW-electric. Such an 
amount of land is not unreasonable; one 
may recall, for example, that all agricul- 
tural land on earth adds up to about 13 
million square kilometers. However, the 
production of solar energy requires that 
the land put aside for this purpose be 
covered with materials, regardless of the 
particular solar technology to be used. 
The materials installed may amount to 
100 kilograms per square meter (16). if 
one includes the hardware used to pro- 
tect the solar collectors from the ele- 
ments. These are typical systems effects 
that are often not taken into account 
when a new technology is first being con- 
sidered. Only when the technology 
reaches a later stage of development do 
such effects come into view and then 
tend to dominate. If it is assumed that 
each year, 500 million tons of materials 
would have to be set aside just for solar 
power installations, this would imply a 
buildup rate of 100 GW-electric per 
year. It must be emphasized that 500 mil- 
lion tons per year is a large figure; 
today's world production of cement and 
steel amount to about 700 million tons 
per year. This leads us to  the conclusion 
that the production capacity of solar 
power could not reach a dozen terawatt- 
year per year or s o  until after the year 
2030. as  is the case for fusion. And in 
both cases we have disregarded the 
question of costs. 
What is left is the soft version, o r  local 
use, of solar power. Such power might 
very well be of local significance; how- 
ever, on a global scale its contribution is 
limited. For example, the total roof area 
per capita may amount to 40 square me- 
ters, but only one-fourth of this area 
might be suitable for collecting solar 
power. With 40 watts per square meter 
of effective solar power being harnessed 
in the low-temperature domain, one 
would obtain 400 watts per capita, or, for 
8 billion people. a total of 3.2 TW-year 
per year. This back-of-an-envelope cal- 
culation does not take into account such 
problems as low-temperature storage or 
costs or special local conditions. But the 
argument is sufficiently robust to con- 
clude that such soft solar power does not 
match the scale of global energy de- 
mand. I t  turns out to be a valuable but 
limited contribution. In the scenarios, 
both high and low. the contributions of 
soft solar may be somewhat too small. In 
a linear programming approach, which 
optimizes discounted costs, it is difficult 
to arrive at meaningful estimates for the 
year 2030 and the seven world regions of 
the whole globe. But is is maintained that 
the contribution from soft solar energy 
will be a few terawatt-year per year. not 
a few dozens of terawatt-year per year. 
Other Renewables 
I n  addition to solar power there are the 
renewable energy sources with a some- 
what local character that invite special 
consideration. Indeed, because local 
conditions are different and sometimes 
special. there are important local oppor- 
tunities that do not become explicit in a 
global study. Often these sources are re- 
ferred to as "soft"; however, it is inter- 
esting to make estimates of the global po- 
tential of such local, renewable sources. 
Hydropower seems to have a potential of 
2.2 TW-electric of generating capacity 
(17). and this figure is hardly disputed. 
The renewables that remain include bio- 
mass, geothermal. and wind energy. In 
the analysis that underlies this article. i t  
is concluded that the energy from these 
sources might add up to 2 or 3 TW-year 
per year. These upper limits are not well 
defined and therefore are potentially 
controversial. However. it  should be 
kept in mind that soft energy sources be- 
come harder as the scale on which they 
are produced increases. Therefore there 
is agreement with proponents of soft en- 
ergy paths that the soft renewables could 
have a global total potential in the order 
of 8 TW-year per year. Hard solar power 
is to be added to this figure. 
With 8 billion people by the year 2030. 
8 TW-year per year would mean 1 kW- 
year per year per capita as the global av- 
erage. Today's average is 2 kW-year per 
year per capita. As mentioned before. it 
is not physically impossible to live with 1 
kW-year per year. especially once capi- 
tal (and time) is available for the sub- 
stitution of services from energy with 
services from capital. labor, and know- 
how. But the llASA analysis also makes 
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it clear that drastic changes of the struc- 
ture of the economy would be required. 
This has far-reaching social and political 
implications and leads to the question of 
what happens politically when the gross 
national product of one group of nations 
consists of 20 percent steel and 80 per- 
cent arts, and the gross national product 
of another group of nations is nominally 
equal but consists of 80 percent steel and 
20 percent arts. In fact, the hard-soft 
controversy is mostly a political one; the 
physical science aspects are rather clear. 
Energy from Gas 
In the reference scenarios, the cau- 
tious assumption was made that gas 
would not be transported inter- 
continentally. Thus gas is of regional sig- 
nificance only and its contribution, while 
increasing in absolute terms, remains 
somewhat constant in relative terms. 
The resource situation allows for higher 
energy contributions from gas, but only 
for a couple of decades given today's 
knowledge. Where 837 TW-year is the 
total recoverable oil (see Table 6), 538 
TW-year is the total recoverable gas, its 
share of conventional resources being 
267 TW-year. 
Given the limited supply opportuni- 
ties, it is likely that the problems of inter- 
continental transportation of gas will be 
solved. The technical problems associat- 
ed with LNG (liquid natural gas) tankers 
and large-diameter or high-pressure pipe- 
lines. as well as methane-methanol con- 
versions, are not insurmountable. Hy- 
drogen produced by electrolysis or ther- 
molysis using energy from nonfossil 
sources such as nuclear breeders and so- 
lar power would be suitable for an exten- 
sion of the infrastructure for the trans- 
port and distribution of natural gas. It 
could thus allow for a certain flexibility 
of energy strategies that might be re- 
quired in view of the CO, problem, or in 
view of other shortcomings on the sup- 
ply end of oil and coal. 
A Word on Cost Ranges 
It is true that the analysis did not start 
on the side of costs and prices, but nev- 
ertheless, that aspect was constantly 
monitored. On the supply side, oil and 
natural gas production costs were con- 
sidered. Note that these were costs and 
not prices. By definition we arbitrarily 
eliminated the political and, specifically, 
the monetary aspects of the problem. 
Actually, three cost categories were con- 
sidered: $0 to $12, $12 to $20, and $20 to 
$25 per barrel of oil equivalent. For coal 
the categories were: $0 to $25 per ton 
and $25 to $50 per ton; and for uranium, 
$80 and $80 to $130 per kilogram of ura- 
nium. All figures are in constant 1975 
dollars. The linear program then picked 
resources as necessary. In additon, capi- 
tal costs were entered into the linear pro- 
gram. They ranged from $170 per kilo- 
watt for gas turbines up to $920 per kilo- 
watt for the fast breeder reactors, up to 
$1900 per kilowatt for solar central sta- 
tions in the case of electricity generation, 
and from $60 to $320 per kilowatt of 
secondary energy in the case of district 
heating. The weighted average cost of 
final energy thus increases by a factor of 
2.4 to 3.0 between 1972 and 2030. 
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Observations 
It is not too difficult to envisage a satis- 
factory energy system for even more 
than 8 billion people in the long-distance 
future. As secondary energy, such a sys- 
tem would make use of electricity and 
hydrogen; as primary energy, nuclear 
power from fusion or fission breeder re- 
actors would be used as well as solar 
power. The carbon atom would be used 
for the most part only insofar as reduced 
carbon is produced by photosynthesis. 
In effect this would mean the recycling of 
CO,. In this event the problems associat- 
ed with obtaining fossil resources and 
disposing of CO, would be eliminated. 
The next 50 vears is too brief a period for 
is a case in point. But the buildup of ap- 
propriate infrastructures must also be 
considered in this context: adapting gas 
pipelines for the transport of hydrogen is 
an example. 
The intertwining of the two transitions 
can also be differently expressed: during 
the next 50 years we will not really be 
resource-constrained; the constraints will 
only be developing. However, between 
2030 and 2080, the resource constraints 
will come to the forefront, and then 
the transition from fossil to nonfossil 
resources will have to be completed. 
Balancing demand and supply on a 
worldwide basis required the use of all 
supply and demand opportunities. Coal, 
oil, and gas, as well as nuclear. were 
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